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INTRODUCTION 
The Brief of Appellee argues at length that Mr. Graham's wrongful 
termination claim is preempted under the "indispensable element test" 
established by Retherford v. AT & T Commc 'ns of Mountain States, Inc., 844 
P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). However, the Retherford indispensable element test 
only applies to determining the scope of preemption after a statute has been 
found to have a preemptive effect. It does not apply to the initial 
determination of whether a particular statutory remedy has any preemptive 
effect at all, which is the issue in the present case. 
The proper analytical model for determining whether a statutory 
remedy has any preemptive effect, in the absence of an express preemption 
provision, is the "field preemption" analysis applied by this Court in 
Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 95; 61 P.3d 989, 991 (Utah 2002). 
Under Gott ling, an intent to preempt may be inferred only if the court finds a 
"clear and manifest" intent to preempt on the part of the Legislature, based 
upon specific factors, such as where the comprehensive nature of the 
statutory remedy leaves no room for supplementation, or where the 
recognition of a common law claim would conflict with the statutory 
purpose. The burden of proving such an intent is on the party asserting 
preemption. 
1 
In the present case, the District Court did not allocate the burden of 
proof on the preemption defense, made no finding of a "clear and manifest" 
Legislative intent, and failed to identify specific factors indicating an intent 
to preempt on the part of the Legislature, as required by Gottling. 
The District Court also failed to consider Utah Code §34A-6-l 10, 
which expressly states that common law claims are not preempted by the 
UOSHAct. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellee has not contested Mr. Graham's Statement of the Issue for 
Review within his principal Brief, which is: whether the administrative 
remedy provided by Utah Code §34A-6-203 of the Utah Occupational 
Safety and Health Act ("UOSH Act") preempts Mr. Graham's claim for 
Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy. Appellee admits that 
the District Court's decision upon summary judgment is reviewed on appeal 
for correctness, without deference to the District Court's legal conclusions. 
Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 95; 61 P.3d 989, 991 (Utah 2002). 
(See Brief of Appellee, pages 2-3) 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of the Facts. 
Appellee's Brief does not dispute any of the facts that were set forth 
within Mr. Graham's principal Brief, at pages 3-4. However, Appellee's 
Brief alleges additional facts, at pages 3-4, which are disputed by Mr. 
Graham. 
First, Appellee alleges that Mr. Graham "suffered a minor injury to 
his back." Mr. Graham did suffer a back injury, which was sufficient to 
require medical treatment and substantial restrictions to his work duties for a 
period of over two months. [R. 55]. Mr. Graham was still on restricted work 
duties at the time of his termination on February 10, 2017. Therefore, Mr. 
Graham objects to the description of his injury as "minor." 
Appellee's Brief states at pages 3-4: 
"Albertson's contends that Graham's termination which was 
originally initiated by Graham as a voluntary termination for personal 
reasons and to focus on school, ultimately was a result of a 
combination of factors, including various work-related incidents and 
dishonesty by Graham." ( citing R. 0289-0294 ). 
Albertson's has produced no evidence that Mr. Graham's termination 
was "a result of a combination of factors." In the District Court, Albertson's 
alleged several post-hoc criticisms of Mr. Graham's work performance. [R. 
0289-0294]. However, Mr. Graham received no discipline in relation to 
3 
these complaints during his employment, nor were they cited in relation to 
Mr. Graham's termination. To the contrary, Albertson's has consistently 
asserted that Mr. Graham voluntarily resigned his employment. 1 
Additionally, the "Argument" Section of Appellee's Brief includes an 
important factual assertion, specifically: "that allowing persons to pursue 
tort claims with more generous damages and a longer limitations period 
would discourage at least some of them from making administrative 
complaints to the Division .... " (Brief of Appellee at page 14). Although the 
District Court made a similar finding (see District Court's Order at R. 567], 
no evidence was produced in support of this assertion, and it constitutes 
mere speculation. The one known specific example - the present case - is 
1 Although Mr. Graham initially submitted a Voluntary Termination form to 
Albertson's, his resignation was mutually rescinded when he disclosed to 
Albertson's Human Resources Director, Carrie Burner ("Ms. Burner"), that 
he had experienced workplace retaliation after reporting his injury. [R. 4]. 
Ms. Burner subsequently altered Mr. Graham's Voluntary Termination form, 
without Mr. Graham's knowledge, to reflect a resignation date of February 
10, 2017, which was the date that Mr. Graham was terminated. [R. 6-7]. 
Further, Albertson's written response to Mr. Graham's administrative claim 
in the Utah Labor Commission states in part: "As outlined above, Graham 
was not terminated he quit." [R. 101-102]. 
4 
directly to the contrary, since Mr. Graham filed claims in both the Utah 
Labor Commission and the District Court. 2 
A. Procedural History. 
Appellee's Brief states, at page 4: "The Division investigated 
Graham's complaint and issued an Order that the evidence did not support a 
finding that Albertson's had terminated Graham in violation of the DOSH 
Act." 
Although this is true, the DOSH Investigator also found that: 
"Respondent has not alleged a cause for Complainant's termination as it is 
Respondent's position that Complainant voluntarily terminated his 
employment." [R. 68]. The Investigator also found that Mr. Graham did not 
voluntarily terminate his employment. [R. 69]. The investigator further 
found Ms. Burner's claim that she met with Mr. Graham on February 10, 
2017 (to revise his resignation notice) to be "an allegation that is not 
supported by the facts." [Id]. 
Appellee's Brief states at page 9, in part: 
"On December 7, 2018, Graham filed a Motion for Leave to Amend 
Complaint [R. 0642-0648]. Among other things, Graham sought to 
amend his Complaint to assert a claim for wrongful discharge in 
2 Even where a claimant prefers the judicial remedy, the relative speed and 
informality of the administrative process provides an opportunity for prompt 
investigation and potential settlement of the claim. 
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violation of public policy based on allegations that Albertson's 
retaliated against him .. . not_for exercising a right under the UOSH 
Act, but 'for claiming and receiving workers' compensation 
benefits .. .. '" ( emphasis in original). 
This statement incorrectly implies a degree of inconsistency between 
Mr. Graham's wrongful termination claims based upon the UOSH Act and 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, and thereby fundamentally 
misconstrues the relationship between the two Acts. The reporting of a 
workplace injury is both a protected action under §34A-6-203 of the UOSH 
Act and an essential element in filing a claim for workers compensation 
benefits under the Utah Workers Compensation Act, See Utah Code §34A-2-
407. Therefore, no inconsistency exists in claiming that a worker was 
discharged for reporting his injury and also for claiming workers' 
compensation benefits. 3 
ARGlTh1ENT 
I. MR. GRAHAM'S WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIM IS 
NOT PREEMPTED UNDER THE RETHERFORD 
INDISPENSIBLE ELEMENT TEST. 
Appellee's Brief argues at length that Mr. Graham's wrongful 
termination claim is barred under the "indispensable element test" 
3 The Utah Workers' Compensation Act includes an anti-retaliation 
provision which expressly "does not affect the rights or obligations of an 
employee or employer under common law." Utah Code §34-2-114(5). 
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established by Retherford v. AT&T Commc 'ns of Mountain States, Inc., 844 
P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). (See Brief of Appellee at pages 10-11; 15-20). 
Appellee asserts that the indispensable element test provides an alternative 
basis for preemption, in addition to "the more generally applicable field 
preemption analysis applied by this Court .... " (Appellee's Brief at pages 2, 
40). However, the Retherford indispensable element test applies only to the 
scope of preemption once a statute has been determined to have a 
preemptive effect. It does not apply to the initial determination of whether a 
particular statutory remedy has any preemptive effect at all, which is the 
issue in the present case. 
In Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 95; 61 P.3d 989,991 (Utah 
2002), this Court recognized that, in many cases, a statutory remedy does not 
contain an express provision for preemption. In such cases, the Court must 
determine whether or not preemption should be inferred from the structure 
and purpose of the statute. In order to infer such an intent, the statutory 
language must "reveal a clear, but implicit, preemptive intent." Gottling, 
2002 UT 95, 8. The present Appeal involves the issue that was raised in 
Gottling, which is whether the statutory remedy at issue has any preemptive 
effect; it does not involve the Retherford indispensable element test, which 
7 
determines the scope of preemption only after a statute has been found to 
have a preemptive effect.4 
Notably, Gottling did not rely upon Retherford 's indispensable 
element test in reaching its conclusion. Instead, the Gottling court applied 
the analytical model for preemption that is set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court in Barnett Bank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 517 U.S. 25, 
31 (1996) and other cases. (See Gottling, 2002 UT 95 ,r 8). In fact, the 
Gottling court expressly declined to apply the Retherford preemption test, 
which it described as a "very specialized test" and applicable only "where 
the statute at issue offers a remedy for a specific type of injury caused by an 
act of the defendant and where the asserted common law causes of action, 
while based on the same facts, offer a remedy for a potentially different 
injury based on those same facts." (See Gottling, 2002 UT 95 ,r 8 note 1 ). 
4 This analysis is consistent with the District Court's Order Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Denying Plaintiffs Motion for 
Leave to Perform Discovery, dated October 12, 2018. ("District Court's 
Order"). [R. 565-569]. The District Court's Order first determined that the 
relevant Statute was intended to have a preemptive effect, and thereafter 
determined that Mr. Graham's wrongful termination claim was within the 
scope of preemption under Retherford. The District Court did not find that 
Retherford provides an "alternative" basis for finding preemption, as 
asserted within the Brief of Appellee at pages 6 and 40. 
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The present case does not involve the issue addressed in Retherford. Rather, 
it falls within the scope of cases, recognized in Gottling, where the statutory 
remedy does not contain an express provision for preemption. 
In Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23; 997 P.2d 305 (Utah 2000), the 
plaintiff claimed that the defendant was negligent in serving beer to an 
assailant at a social event. The defendant asserted that the plaintiffs 
negligence claim was preempted by the Utah Dramshop Act, Utah Code 
§32A-14-1 et seq. The Dramshop Act contained no preemption provision 
regarding the liability of social hosts. (Gilger, 2000 UT 2316). As in 
Gottling, this Court applied general field preemption principles to determine 
whether the Dramshop Act was intended to preempt the Plaintiffs claim. 
( Gilger, 2000 UT 23 ,Il 1 ). The Gilger court expressly found that the 
Retherford analytical model was inapplicable, stating: 
Hernandez suggests that our analytical model for determining whether 
the Dramshop Act preempts any common law causes of action should 
be found in Retherford v. AT & T Communications, 844 P.2d 949 
(Utah 1992). However, the Retherford preemption test only applies to 
a specific type of preemption: where the statute at issue offers a 
remedy for a specific type of injury caused by an act of the defendant 
and where the asserted common law causes of action, while based on 
the same facts, offer a remedy for a potentially different injury based 
on those same facts. See id. at 965. In such situations, we have held 
that the intent to preempt is determined by "the nature of the injury for 
which [the] plaintiff makes [the] claim, not the nature of the 
defendant's act which the plaintiff alleges to have been responsible for 
that injury." Id. (quotation omitted) (alterations in original). Because 
we do not face this narrow type of preemption claim here, we need not 
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engage in the analysis laid out in Retherford, although it remains fully 
appropriate in situations for which it was designed. (Gilger, 2000 UT 
23110). 
Gottling and Gilger establish that the proper analytical model for 
determining whether a statutory remedy has a preemptive effect towards 
common law claims is the field preemption analysis developed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Barnett Bank and other cases. The Retherford 
indispensable element test applies in determining the scope of preemption 
after a statutory remedy is found to have a preemptive effect. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MR. 
GRAHAM'S WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIM IS 
BARRED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY UNDER 
THE UOSH ACT. 
A. The District Court Did Not Apply the Appropriate Legal 
Standards in this Case. 
Mr. Graham argued in his principal Brief that the District Court failed 
to apply the appropriate legal standards in this case by, inter alia, failing to 
allocate the burden of proof on the preemption defense to the Appellant, and 
by failing to find a "clear and manifest purpose" on the part of the 
Legislature to preempt Mr. Graham's claim, as required by Gottling, 2002 
UT 95 ,r 8. (See Brief of the Appellant at pages 11-13). 
Appellee dismisses these arguments by reading additional language 
into the District Court's Order. (See Brief of Appellee At pages 31-32). 
However, the best evidence of the District Court's reasoning is the express 
language of its Order, which contains no discussion of the burden of proof or 
finding as to the Legislature's "clear and manifest purpose." These 
requirements are important to ensure that preemption is not "lightly 
inferred" based merely upon the existence of a statutory remedy. State v. 
Jones, 958 P.2d 938, 940-41) (quoting International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 
479 U.S. 481,491 (1987)). 
In enacting a statutory remedy, the Utah Legislature is assumed to 
have acted advisedly, Gottling, 2002 UT 95 , 8. 5 The Utah Legislature has 
often created express provisions for preemption where that was its intent. 
The absence of an express preemption provision in the UOSH Act indicates 
a lack of such intent in the absence of additional facts or analysis indicating 
to the contrary, particularly where the Act expressly states that it does not 
"diminish or affect" common law claims. (See Utah Code 34A-6-l 10(2). In 
order to infer an intent to preempt where none is expressly provided, the 
courts must :find a "clear and manifest" intent based upon specified factors, 
such as where the statutory remedy is so pervasive that it leaves no room for 
5 Utah Code §34A-6-203 became effective May 10, 2016, which is after this 
Court's decisions in Gottling and Gilger. Therefore, the Utah Legislature 
was presumably aware of this Court's decisions regarding statutory 
preemption of common law claims at the time of its enactment. 
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supplementation, or where the recognition of a common law claim would 
conflict with the statutory purpose. (Id.). The District Court's Order in the 
present case provides no finding of a clear and manifest intent to preempt on 
the part of the Legislature. 
Mr. Graham's principal Brief further argues that the District Court 
failed to cite sufficient grounds to support preemption. (See Brief of the 
Appellant, 15-17). The only grounds for preemption cited by the District 
Court are: (1) that claimants would be discouraged from filing 
administrative claims by the existence of a common law remedy, and (2) that 
a common law remedy might interfere with the "broader purpose of 
providing for the safety and health of all workers" in some unspecified 
manner. [R. 566-670]. 
As to the first of these grounds, no evidence or analysis has been 
provided to support a conclusion that recognition of a common law remedy 
would cause injured workers to forego their administrative remedy. It is just 
as reasonable to assume that injured workers would utilize both remedies, as 
Mr. Graham did, or that they would forego the administrative process in any 
event due to its extremely restrictive limitations period and remedies. No 
evidence has been produced regarding the filing or disposition of 
12 
administrative claims under the UOSH Act, or even that the Agency 
considers its procedure to be exclusive.6 
The District Court's Order states in part: 
"[C]laims under the UOSH Act address the concerns not only of 
individual employees but also the broader purpose of providing for the 
safety and welfare of all workers through the broader regulatory 
structure of the UOSH Act." [R. 566-67]. 
The District Court did not expressly state that recognizing Graham's 
wrongful termination claim would conflict with "the broader purpose of 
providing for the safety and welfare of all workers ... ," nor did it provide any 
analysis which would lead to that conclusion. To the contrary, recognition of 
Mr. Graham's wrongful termination claim would further the purposes of the 
UOSHAct. 
In Touchard v. La-Z-Boy Inc., 2006 UT 71; 148 P.3d 945 (Utah 
2006), this Court recognized a claim for wrongful termination in violation of 
public policy based upon employer retaliation for the filing of a workers' 
compensation claim. This Court rejected the employer's argument that such 
claim was preempted by the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, and held that 
6 Appellee's Brief responds to Mr. Graham's argument on this point by 
stating it is "common sense" that workers will forego their administrative 
claims in lieu of a judicial remedy, but provides no evidence or analysis in 
support of that assertion. (See Brief of Appellee at 33). 
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recognition of such a claim would further the purposes of the Act by 
protecting workers against retaliation. Touchard, 2006 UT 71 if22. This 
Court's reasoning in Touchard seems to be equally applicable in the present 
case. 
In Gottling and Gilger, this Court conducted an extensive analysis of 
the relationship between the statutory remedies and the proposed common 
law claims. In both cases, this Court identified competing interests with 
which the proposed common law claims would conflict - In Gottling, the 
interest of protecting small employers against costs associated with 
discrimination claims, and in Gilger, the interest of protecting social hosts 
against costs associated with negligence claims. In each case, this Court 
found that recognition of the common law claim would conflict with the 
competing interest in a manner that was inconsistent with the intent of the 
Legislature. However, there is no such competing interest in the present 
case. Neither the District Court nor Appellee have asserted that the UOSH 
Act is intended to shield employers who retaliate against their workers for 
reporting workplace injuries. Recognition of Mr. Graham's common law 
claim would not conflict with the purposes of the UOSH Act, but would 
promote such purposes. 
14 
Appellee's Brief at pages 25-26 discusses various provisions of the 
UOSH Act in an attempt to show that the UOSH Act is "comprehensive." 
However, comprehensiveness for purposes of field preemption does not 
mean merely that the statute is lengthy or detailed, but that it reflects a 
legislative intent to exclude other remedies.7 Further, to determine 
comprehensiveness, the court must focus on the particular portion of the 
statute that is at issue. Craig v. Provo City, 2016 UT 40 ,16; 389 P.3d 423, 
426 (Utah 2016). In the present case, although the UOSH Act contains 
extensive provisions relating to workplace safety and employer records, the 
portion of the Act devoted to anti-retaliation is very brief and limited. See 
Utah Code §34A-6-203(1) and (2). By contrast, the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act, which was at issue in Gottling and Retherford, contains 
extensive provisions relating to the investigation and resolution of 
complaints, in addition to an express exclusive remedy provision. See 34A-
5-101, et seq.8 
7 See Gottling, 2002 UT 95 ~ 8 ("Thus, where a statute's plain language or 
its structure and purpose demonstrate a legislative intent to preempt an area 
of law, the statute becomes the only source of law in that area .... " (emphasis 
added). 
8 Appellee' s Brief at page 19 cites the unpublished opinion in Johnson v. 
E.A. Miller, Inc., 172 F.3d 62 (10th Cir 1999) in which the court held that "to 
the extent plaintiffs wrongful termination claims are based on 
UOSHA ... they are preempted . . .. " However, the court's brief statement in 
15 
The District Court in this case failed to allocate the burden of proof, 
and failed to find a "clear and manifest intent" to preempt on the part of the 
Legislature. Further, the grounds for preemption cited by the District Court 
are unsupported by sufficient evidence, and fail to show either that the 
Legislature intended to preempt the field of remedies relating to employer 
retaliation arising from reports of workplace injuries, or that recognition of 
Mr. Graham's wrongful termination claim would conflict with the 
Legislature's intent. 
B. The District Court Did Not Properly Consider Mr. Graham's 
Evidence Against Preemption. 
In the District Court, Mr. Graham argued that the UOSH Act 
expressly reflects a legislative intent against preemption of his common law 
claim. (Brief of the Appellant at 17-18). Specifically, Utah Code §34A-6-
110 states in relevant part: 
(1) Nothing in this chapter is deemed to limit or repeal requirements 
imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or held to supersede or 
in any manner affect workers' compensation or enlarge or diminish or 
affect the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of 
employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, 
occupational or other diseases, or death of employees arising out of, 
or in the course of employment. ( emphasis added). 
Johnson provides no analysis of the UOSH Act or the standards relating to 
statutory preemption. 
16 
These provisions indicate that the rights created under the UOSH Act 
are not intended to be exclusive, and expressly preserve requirements 
"otherwise imposed by law" and do not "diminish or affect" common law 
rights. However, the District Court's Order contains no reference to §34A-6-
110. 
Appellee argues that the above-quoted language of §34A-6-110 is 
limited to workers compensation claims, relying upon the heading of §34A-
6-1 l 0, which states: "Requirements of other laws not limited or repealed -
Worker's Compensation or rights under other laws with respect to 
employment injuries not affected." (Brief of Appellee at 35-36). 
As an initial matter, the title or caption of a statute is generally not 
part of the statute's text, and is only considered where the statutory language 
is ambiguous. Funk v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 839 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah 
1992). Moreover, the heading of §34A-6-110 actually supports Mr. 
Graham's position in this case, since it refers to "other laws" in addition to 
workers' compensation claims. (Id.). 
Appellee argues that §34A-6-110 is limited to claims arising out of 
physical or mental injuries in the workplace. (See Brief of Appellee at 35-
36). However, Appellee makes no argument that Mr. Graham's claim fails to 
17 
meet that requirement. Mr. Graham's workplace injury is an essential 
element of his wrongful termination claim. Appellee does not argue that Mr. 
Graham's claim falls outside the scope of the UOSH Act. To the contrary, 
Appellee's preemption defense is based upon the premise that Mr. Graham's 
claim does fall within the scope of the UOSH Act. Accordingly, the 
preservation of rights established by §34A-6-l 10 applies to Mr. graham's 
claim. 
Mr. Graham argued in the District Court that a legislative intent 
against preemption is reflected within certain provisions ofR614-1-10.L.3-5 
of the Utah Administrative Code which expressly defer to "other forums 
established to resolve disputes which may also be related to Section 34A-6-
203 complaints." See R614-1-10.L.2. 9 
Appellee's Brief argues, at page 37, that, since R614-1-10.L is an 
administrative rule, it "provides no evidence of legislative intent." This is a 
valid point.10 However, the Agency's position with respect to the exclusivity 
of its administrative remedy is relevant to the District Court's suggestion 
9 See Brief of the Appellant at pages 18-21 for Mr. Graham's full argument 
regarding R6 l 4-l- l O .L.3-5. 
10 See Ferro v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507,512 and note 7 (Utah 
App. 1992)("Agency rules are therefore of little value in interpreting a 
statute unless the discretion to interpret the statute has been explicitly or 
implicitly granted to the agency by the Legislature"). 
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that Mr. Graham's common law claim might interfere with the 
administrative process. 
The District Court found that the deferral provisions ofR614-1-10.L 
apply only to "arbitration and other agency proceedings." [R. 566]. 
However, that construction is contrary to the broad language ofR614-1-10.L 
which generally defers to "remedies other than those provided by Section 
34A-6-203" so long as they meet certain criteria. 
Appellee's Brief at page 37 argues that the District Court's 
interpretation ofR614-l-10.L.3-5 is correct, based upon the caption to the 
Rule, which states: "Arbitration or other agency proceedings." However, this 
argument elevates the language of the caption over the actual text of the 
Rule, contrary to general principles of statutory construction, which are 
applicable to administrative rules. Ferro v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 828 
P.2d 507, 512 (Utah App. 1992). Further, Appellee's argument misses the 
relevant point, which is not that R614-1-10.L.3-5 expressly defers to Mr. 
Graham's common law claim, but rather that the administrative remedy is 
not exclusive. Since the administrative remedy under §34A-6-203 defers to 
other forums to adjudicate "disputes which may also be related to Section 
19 
34A-6-203," the administrative remedy is clearly not exclusive, and does not 
preempt the field relating to such claims. I I 
Appellee did not respond to Mr. Graham's point that numerous types 
of legal claims may arise from the reporting of workplace injuries which are 
independent from the OSHA Act. 12 The administrative remedy provided by 
Utah Code §34A-6-203 cannot reasonably be construed as the exclusive 
remedy for employer retaliation arising from the reporting of workplace 
InJUfleS. 
C. The Limited Remedies Under §34A-6-203(2)(c) Support an 
Inference Against Preemption. 
Mr. Graham's principal Brief argues that the very short limitations 
period (30 days) and limited remedies (reinstatement with back pay) under 
§34A-6-203(2)(a) support an inference that the Statute is not intended to be 
11 Notably, the Agency' s Rules expressly incorporate numerous court 
decisions, supporting a conclusion that common law remedies supplement, 
rather than conflict with, the administrative remedy. See R614-1-10.L.3-5 
and cases cited therein. 
12 Such claims include workers' compensation benefits under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code §34A-2-101, et seq.; claims for 
private health, disability insurance and sick leave under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq.; claims 
for medical leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") 29 
U.S.C. §2601 et seq.; claims for reasonable accommodation and disability 
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 
U.S.C. §12101 et seq.; and claims of employer retaliation under the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA"), 29 U.S.C. §660(c). 
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an exclusive remedy. It strains credulity to assert that the Legislature 
intended to provide such limited protection for workers who report their 
workplace injuries. 
Appellee correctly observes that limitations on remedies alone do not 
create an inference against preemption. (Brief of Appellee at 41, citing 
Gottling, 2002 UT 95 ,r,r 8-14). However, the present case does not involve 
an express preemption provision as in Gottling and Retherford. In the 
present case, where the issue involves the determination of whether a 
statutory remedy has any preemptive effect at all, narrow limitations on the 
scope of the statutory remedy may be relevant in determining whether it is 
intended to preempt alternative remedies. 
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Mr. Graham has claimed his attorney's fees in this case based upon 
his breach of contract claim in the District Court. Such claim is not at issue 
on this Appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse and vacate the Order of the District Court 
dismissing Mr. Graham's claim for wrongful termination in violation of 
public policy on the grounds of pre-emption under Utah Code §34A-6-203 
and remand the case for further proceedings in the District Court. 
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